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Abstract 
Criteria of empirical significance are supposed to state conditions under which (putative) 
reference to an unobservable object or property is “empirically meaningful.” The 
intended kind of empirical meaningfulness should be necessary for admissibility into the 
selective contexts of scientific inquiry. I defend Justus’s recent argument that the reasons 
generally given for rejecting the project of defining a significance criterion are 
unpersuasive. However, as I show, this project remains wedded to an overly narrow 
conception of its subject matter. Even the most cutting edge significance criteria identify 
empirical significance with predictive power, and thereby rule out vocabulary with 
legitimate scientific functions. In a nutshell, the problem is that there are (“shortcut”) 
terms that reduce the computational burden of extracting predictions from theory, and 
that may therefore be scientifically useful, but that do not produce any novel predictions, 
and so are ruled scientifically inadmissibility by existing significance criteria. I spell out 
this objection by specifying shortcut terms that are ruled inadmissible by Creath’s and 
Schurz’s criteria. Having objected in this way to extant criteria, and to the equation of 
empirical significance with predictive power in general, I discuss an approach to defining 
empirical significance that is capable of avoiding my objection and, more ambitiously, 
that may break the cycle of “punctures and patches” that has plagued the project from the 
beginning. I gloss Goldfarb and Ricketts’s idea of “case-by-case” delineations of 
empirically significant terms as the provision of special rather than general explications 
of the informal concept of empirical significance. 
 
1. Introduction 
Criteria of empirical significance are supposed to state conditions under which reference 
to an unobservable object or property (‘electron’, e.g.) is “empirically meaningful”. The 
intended kind of empirical meaningfulness is supposed to be necessary for admissibility 
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into the highly selective contexts of scientific inquiry. In their heyday, the logical 
empiricists—the original champions of significance criteria—believed that these criteria 
would illuminate scientific methodology and also expose metaphysics as a kind of 
defective attempt to talk about unobservables. Of course, these two rationales are 
mutually independent and the project of defining a significance criterion—call this the 
significance project—does not depend on either one individually. 
According to standard historical accounts, the logical empiricists failed decisively 
in their attempts to state significance criteria. This failure is said to have been exposed by 
the objections of Church (1949), Hempel (1951), Achinstein (1968), and Kaplan (1975). 
Thus the significance project has been almost completely supplanted by the view that 
empirical meaningfulness cannot belong to individual sentences, but only to larger 
networks of theories. 
There is good reason to doubt this received view. Justus (2014) points out that it 
focuses disproportionately on the shortcomings of Ayer’s principles of verification, and 
that “scrutiny of the criticisms actually made of later significance criteria, some of which 
differ radically from Ayer’s, provides little support for” (Justus 2014, 416) the received 
view’s general pessimism about the significance project. More importantly, proponents of 
significance criteria have successfully responded to the major objections that have been 
raised. Thus Carnap (1956a) addresses Church’s (1949) and Hempel’s (1951) objection, 
Creath (1976) addresses Kaplan’s (1975), and Schurz (1991; 2014b) Achinstein’s (1968); 
the latter two responses remain unscathed decades after their publications and, as I argue 
below, can be combined into a single criterion that retains the advantages of each. 
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 So Justus is correct when he says that the significance project has been written off 
prematurely and for unpersuasive reasons. However, as I will show, this project remains 
wedded to an overly narrow conception of its subject matter. Even the most cutting edge 
and formally sophisticated significance criteria identify empirical significance with 
predictive power, and thereby rule out vocabulary with legitimate scientific functions. In 
a nutshell, the problem is that there are terms—I call them ‘shortcut terms’—that reduce 
the computational burden of extracting predictions from theory, and that may therefore be 
scientifically useful, but that cannot be used to augment the containing theory’s 
observational consequence class, and so are ruled scientifically inadmissible by existing 
significance criteria. In what follows, I will spell out this objection by specifying shortcut 
terms that are ruled inadmissible by Creath’s and Schurz’s criteria.  
Having objected in this way to extant criteria, and to the equation of empirical 
significance with predictive power in general, I will discuss an approach to defining 
empirical significance that is capable of avoiding my objection and, more ambitiously, 
that may break the cycle of “punctures and patches” (Lewis 1988) that has plagued the 
significance project since its inception. The approach is inspired by Goldfarb and 
Ricketts’s (1992) idea of “case-by-case” delineations of empirically significant terms; I 
gloss this idea as the provision of, in Carnap’s (1937) terminology, (relatively) “special” 
rather than (fully) “general” explications of the informal concept of empirical 
significance. 
 
2. Creath’s Response to Kaplan’s Objection 
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The project of defining empirical significance begins with the informal idea that 
theoretical science is distinguished from other kinds of discourse at least in part by the 
nature of its connection to observation. Carnap (1956a) suggests that the appropriate 
connection to observation occurs, in the first instance, at the level of sub-sentential terms: 
a term, he suggests, is empirically significant just in case it occurs in a sentence that 
makes a “difference for the prediction of an observable event” (Carnap 1956a, 49). This 
characterization of the connection is informal and awaits precise formulation; it is an 
explicandum waiting to be explicated. (I say more about the methodology of explication 
in section 8.) Many explicata have been proposed, and many of these have been 
“punctured” by counter-examples. I will not here rehearse the complete history of these 
punctures and the subsequent patches, but will instead begin with the current state of the 
art. 
I begin, then, with Creath’s (1976) criterion, and with a kind of linguistic 
apparatus that it presupposes, viz., what Carnap called a “language for science”. This is 
an axiomatization of some body of scientific theory in an artificial language whose 
grammatical, proof theoretic, and semantic rules have been explicitly stated. A Carnapian 
language for science is divided into an observation language LO and a theoretical 
language LT, where all the descriptive terms of LO—the set of which is VO—refer to 
directly observable properties, processes, or individuals. LT’s sentences contain 
“theoretical terms”—the set of which is VT—whose ties to observation are more indirect.1 
                                                
1 Carnap provides a “rough explanation” of the notion of an observation term, which 
grounds the distinction between VO and VT: 
A predicate ‘P’ of a language L is called observable for an organism (e.g. a 
person) N, if, for suitable arguments, e.g. ‘b’, N is able under suitable 
circumstances to come to a decision with the help of few observations about a full 
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Carnap gives as examples of theoretical terms terms that refer “to micro-particles like 
electrons or atoms, to the electromagnetic field or the gravitational field in physics, to 
drives and potentials of various kinds in psychology” (Carnap 1956a, 38). A language for 
science is used to state theoretical postulates T and correspondence rules C. T is the 
conjunction of the posited natural laws containing only terms of VT; C is the conjunction 
of postulates that contain both observation and theoretical terms. One of the purposes of a 
significance criterion is to identify conditions of admissibility into VT (Carnap 1956a, 38-
39). 
Creath proposed his criterion partially in response to Kaplan’s (1975) contention 
that significance criteria should be insensitive to deoccamization. A language is 
deoccamized when its theoretical postulates T′ and correspondence rules C′ are formed 
from some other theoretical postulates T and correspondence rules C “either by replacing 
all occurrences of certain elements of VT by the conjunction of two new primitive 
constants of the same type, or by replacing all occurrences of certain elements of VT by 
the disjunction of two new primitive constants of the same type” in T and C (Kaplan 
1975, 91). Kaplan assumes that significance criteria should be insensitive to 
deoccamization, i.e., that if a term M of L is reckoned significant by a given criterion, 
then this criterion should reckon M1 and M2 significant when M1&M2 replaces M in a 
                                                                                                                                            
sentence, say ‘P(b)’, i.e. to a confirmation of either ‘P(b)’ or ‘~P(b)’ of such a 
high degree that he will either accept or reject ‘P(b)’. (Carnap 1936-7, 454-455) 
Degrees of observationality, so understood, lie on a continuum. Carnap proposes that the 
sharp line between VO and VT be drawn at the most convenient point on the continuum 
(Carnap 1966, 226). 
The distinction between observational and theoretical language is contested, but I 
will presuppose it for the sake of argument. For an argument that Carnap only requires an 
innocuous version of this distinction, see Justus (2014, 420).   
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deoccamization of L. I will later argue (following Justus (2014)) that this assumption is in 
need of argument. But well motivated or not, Kaplan’s criticism contributed to the view 
that Carnap’s (1956a) criterion, which was sensitive to deoccamization, was inadequate, 
and to increased skepticism of the significance project.  
Creath’s (1976) criterion, which results from a small amendment to Carnap’s 
(1956a), was the first to be insensitive to deoccamization. His criterion is given in a 
sequence of three clauses. The first of which, D1′, defines empirical significance for 
primitive terms2 relative to a large theoretical context—a context that includes, in 
particular, other assumptions in LT in addition to T and C. D1′ requires of terms that 
inserting them into this large theoretical context would, through the formulation of a 
sentence containing them, allow us to non-vacuously derive3 an observational prediction 
that we could not otherwise derive in this context. 
D1′. A [primitive] term ‘M’ is significant relative to the class K of terms, with 
respect to LT, LO, T, and C = df the terms of K belong to VT, there is a class J of terms 
to which ‘M’ belongs and such that each term of J belongs to VT but not to K, and 
there are three sentences SJ and SK in LT and SO in LO, such that the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) SJ contains only terms of J as its descriptive terms. 
                                                
2 Creath specifies that the criterion is meant to apply to primitive terms and suggests that 
“[f]or defined terms we need only require in addition that every descriptive term in the 
definiens thereof must be antecedently shown to be significant” (1976, 395). 
3 Carnap’s (1956a) criterion has an analogous requirement that the observation sentence 
be logically derivable within the theoretical context. He seems to treat this requirement as 
a simplifying assumption. A more complete formulation of his criterion would 
encompass also probabilistic relations between theory and observational prediction 
(Carnap 1956a, 49). This point can be applied mutatis mutandis to subsequent criteria. 
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(b) The descriptive terms of SK belong to K.  
(c) The conjunction SK•SJ•T•C is consistent (i.e., not logically false).  
(d) SO is logically implied by the conjunction SJ•SK•T•C.  
(e) SO is not logically implied by SK•T•C. 
(f) There is no set J′, where J′ is a proper subset of J, such that there are 
three sentences SJ′ and SK′ in LT and SO′ in LO, such that the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(fa) SJ′ contains only terms of J′ as its descriptive terms. 
(fb) The descriptive terms in SK′ belong to K. 
(fc) The conjunction SJ′•SK′•T•C is consistent (i.e., not logically false). 
(fd) SO′ is logically implied by the conjunction SJ′•SK′•T•C. 
(fe) SO′ is not logically implied by SK′•T•C. (Creath 1976, 398) 
 Creath’s response to Kaplan is contained in this first clause of the definition. The 
role of the class J in D1′ “secure[s] in a single step whole collections (sets) of terms” 
(Creath 1976, 397), including the pairs of predicates that replace single predicates 
through deoccamization, within the sphere of the empirically significant. 
 Building on D1′, D2′ removes the latter’s relativization to a class K of terms 
antecedently certified empirically significant: 
D2′. A [primitive] term ‘M’ is significant with respect to LT, LO, T, and C = df there 
is a sequence of sets J1, ..., Jn of terms of VT such that ‘M’ belongs to Jn, and every 
member of every set Ji (i = 1, ..., n) is significant relative to the union of J1 
through J(i−1), with respect to LT, LO, T, and C. (Creath 1976, 398) 
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The idea is to start with a set J of terms that occur in a sentence p that non-vacuously 
implies an observation sentence with the help of only the relatively small theoretical 
context of T and C; sentences like p “directly” entail observation sentences. D2′ certifies 
the members of J empirically significant relative to this small context. Now p can be used 
to help certify the terms composing set K as empirically significant relative to the same 
smaller context: the members of K then just need to be certified significant, in the sense 
of D1′, relative to J, LT, LO, T, and C. 
 The third and final clause of Creath’s definition defines sentence significance in 
terms of the component expressions’ significance (in the sense of D2′). 
D3[′]. An expression A of LT is a significant sentence of LT = Df 
a. A satisfies the rules of formation of LT, 
b. every descriptive constant in A is a significant term (in the sense of 
D2[′]).4 (Carnap 1956a, 60; quoted in Creath 1976, 394) 
                                                
4 It is worth noting that by beginning with term significance and working up to sentence 
significance, the definition avoids Church’s (1949) famous counter-example to Ayer’s 
(1946) criterion. Let O1, O2, and O3 be primitive observation predicates and A (for 
‘Absolute’) a primitive “metaphysical” predicate, i.e., a predicate every attribution of 
which the logical empiricists are determined to reject as nonsense. Translating Church’s 
argument from sentential to predicate logic, we get the sentences 
1. [(~(x)O1x)&(x)O2x]∨[(x)O3x&(~(x)Ax)] 
and 
2. (x)O1(x) 
which together imply the observation sentence (x)O3x. According to Ayer’s criterion, a 
sentence is “directly verifiable” if, with other observation sentences, it entails an 
observation sentence that these other observation sentences alone do not entail (Ayer 
1946, 16). So sentence (1) is directly verifiable. And a sentence is empirically significant 
if, together with other directly verifiable sentences, it entails an observation sentence that 
these other directly verifiable sentences alone do not entail. Therefore, since (x)Ax and 
(1) together entail (x)O2x, and since (x)Ax is essential to this entailment, (x)Ax is 
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3. Schurz’s Response to Achinstein’s Objection 
So one of the putative refutations of the significance project has been addressed. I turn 
now to a separate solution to a separate problem for significance criteria: Schurz’s (1991; 
2014b) solution to Achinstein’s (1968) problem of variance over logical equivalents. 
Achinstein assumes 
Principle B: If a sentence (or conjunction of sentences) S is such that the 
occurrence of term M in S suffices to guarantee that M is significant, then the 
occurrence of M in any sentence logically equivalent to S also suffices to 
guarantee that M is significant. (1968, 78) 
He then shows that Carnap’s (1956a) criterion violates this principle; his argument 
applies mutatis mutandis to Creath’s (1976) criterion. Consider a language with 
correspondence rule Sm→So, where So is an observation sentence and Sm is a sentence 
whose only descriptive term is the theoretical term M. Relative to this language, M is 
significant according to Creath’s criterion—it is the only theoretical term in a sentence 
that, in conjunction with the postulates, allows us to non-vacuously derive So (which we 
would not otherwise be able to derive). But now consider a language with theoretical 
postulate is Sm and observational postulate So. Creath’s criterion reckons M non-
                                                                                                                                            
empirically significant. Of course, any sentence can be put in the truth-functional position 
of (x)Ax in (1) and thereby rendered empirically significant by Ayer’s (1946) criterion. 
Creath’s (1976) criterion avoids this problem. The set of primitive descriptive 
predicates occurring in (1) has a proper subset—{O1, O2, O3}—whose members occur in 
sentences that non-vacuously imply (x)O2x. So A’s role in the derivation of (x)O2x does 
not make it empirically significant, according to this criterion. And since the criterion 
builds sentence significance out of term significance, (1) is not empirically significant 
according to Creath’s criterion. (The basic strategy here originates in Carnap’s (1956a) 
criterion.) 
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significant relative to this language. However, Sm&(Sm→So) is logically equivalent to 
Sm&So. So Creath’s criterion contradicts Principle B. 
Achinstein’s example poses a trilemma for significance criteria: deny, counter-
intuitively, Principle B; reckon M significant with respect to both conjunctions and 
accept, counter-intuitively, that Sm&So is significant; or reckon M non-significant with 
respect to both conjunctions and accept, counter-intuitively, that Sm&(Sm→So) is non-
significant (call this the non-significance horn of the trilemma). 
Schurz argues that the solution to this trilemma lies in recognizing that Sm→So is 
an “irrelevant consequence of” So. He defines a novel notion of relevance for this purpose 
for an arbitrary theory T, with ‘theory’ here understood in a broad sense, encompassing 
both Carnapian theoretical postulates, correspondence rules, and observation statements: 
[Definition] Sentence p is a relevant consequence of theory T if and only if no 
predicate in p “is replaceable on some of its occurrences by any other predicate of 
the same arity, salva validitate of” the argument from T to p (1991, 409).5 
[Definition] The set of T’s relevant consequence elements, (T)r, = {p: (i) p is a 
relevant consequence of T and (ii) there is no conjunction q1&…&qn such that (a) 
p is equivalent to q1&…&qn, (b) q1&…&qn is a relevant consequence of T, and 
(c) each qi is shorter than p}. 
Schurz uses the notion of a theory’s relevant consequence elements to explicate empirical 
significance through the following two definitions: 
[Definition] A minimal empirically equivalent axiomatization of (T)r is any 
subset Δ of (T)r such that Δ and T imply exactly the same observation sentences 
                                                
5 Schurz (1991) gives a more formally rigorous inductive definition of ‘relevant 
consequence’ on pp. 410-412. 
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and no subset of (T)r of smaller cardinality than Δ has exactly the same 
observational consequences as T. 
[Definition] A theoretical term t is empirically significant relative to T if and 
only if there is no minimal empirically equivalent axiomatization of (T)r which 
does not contain t (Schurz 1991, 425). 
Applying these definitions to Achinstein’s argument, we find that {So} is a 
minimal empirically equivalent axiomatization of both ({Sm&So})r and 
({Sm&(Sm→So)})r. And since So does not contain M, the term is not empirically 
significant relative to either conjunction. 
Although Schurz’s criterion reckons M non-significant relative to Sm&(Sm→So), 
the criterion is not impaled on the non-significance horn of Achinstein’s trilemma—
rather, it grasps the horn. The scientific point of theoretical jargon is to allow us to in 
some way systematize or unify a relatively large body of observational knowledge on a 
manageably small basis (Schurz 1991, 424-425; Schurz and Lambert 1994). Theoretical 
postulates with meager observational consequences could just as well be replaced by a 
list of these consequences themselves. So for a postulate of theoretical science to earn its 
keep, it would, roughly speaking, have to increase the theory’s observational 
consequences by at least as much as it increases the size or complexity of the theory; as 
Schurz puts it,  
[i]t is the main achievement of a scientific theory to unify its empirical 
consequences, and a theoretical term t is empirically significant within T iff the 
empirical unification provided by T were not possible in a ‘subtheory’ of T which 
does not contain t. (1991, 425; emphasis added) 
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This expectation of theoretical postulates is reflected in Schurz’s requirement that for 
theory T’s terms to be significant, there must be no set of sentences from which the terms 
are absent that achieves empirical equivalence with T by means of fewer sentences than 
occur in (T)r. This is where M falls short with respect to Sm&(Sm→So).6 
So the two biggest thorns in the side of the significance project—the problems of 
deoccamization and variance over logically equivalent theories—have been removed. 
And, happily, the two solutions are compatible. Schurz’s insight fits neatly into Creath’s 
D1′ as the further sub-clause: 
(g) There is no minimal empirically equivalent axiomatization of 
(SK•SJ•T•C)r which does not contain ‘M’, 
thus immunizing Creath’s criterion against Achinstein’s objection. Call this amended 
version of the first clause of the criterion D1′′. D1′′ is, of course, more demanding than 
D1′; the former but not the latter excludes, for example, M relative to Sm&(Sm→So). 
The criterion due to Schurz that I just discussed already preserves empirical significance 
over deoccamization. If we uniformly replace occurrences in T of an empirically 
significant predicate with a disjunction of predicates, then the disjunction of predicates 
will occur in all of T’s minimal empirically equivalent axiomatizations. 
                                                
6 Schurz, writing with Lambert, indicates one way for theories to meet this requirement, 
viz., inclusion of “many Ti’s [i.e., laws of the form ∀x(Fix ⊃ Tx) for various i] plus 
many T ′k’s [i.e., laws of the form ∀x(Tx ⊃ Gkx) for various k]” (Schurz and Lambert 
1994, 88), where each Fi and each Gk is an observational predicate. They comment that 
[t]his is the typical situation where one conjectures in science that there is a 
certain ‘intrinsic’ and not directly observable property of objects, say T(x), 
common to all [observational] properties F1, . . . , Fm, which has as its empirical 
effects the [observational] properties G1, . . . , Gn. T(x) may e.g. mean that ‘x has 
metallic structure’; then the Fi are different kinds of metals, and the Gk are typical 
properties of metals. (Schurz and Lambert 1994, 87) 
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But if, like Kaplan, one is convinced that deoccamizations of empirically 
significant theories must be empirically significant, then one might think Schurz’s 
criterion supersedes Creath’s, and that there is no point in fusing the two into D1′′. The 
purpose of Creath’s criterion is insensitivity to deoccamization, but Schurz’s criterion has 
this property. On the other hand, Schurz’s criterion addresses Achinstein’s objection, 
whereas Creath’s does not. 
However, there are at least two properties of Creath’s criterion that are preserved 
in D1′′ and that are absent from Schurz’s criterion. Whether D1′′ is worth considering 
will depend on the appeal of these properties. First, Creath’s definition, like Carnap’s, 
accords the postulates T and C a special role; it assumes that there is (are) 
some part(s) of theory that observation bears on directly, without the mediation of 
any other theoretical terms or statements. [D2′] reflects this requirement by 
assuming at least one theoretical term is empirically significant through a direct 
connection with observation, that is, unfacilitated by other theoretical terms (when 
[{J1, … , Ji−1}] is null). (Justus 2014, 423) 
As I discussed above, the “direct connection” intended here is occurrence in a sentence 
that, together with T and C alone, non-vacuously implies an observation sentence that T 
and C do not imply. Schurz’s criterion does not make any such requirement of theories. It 
therefore does not require any machinery analogous to the classes of terms J and K in 
Creath’s criterion. Second, D1′(a) requires that SK, the auxiliary sentence antecedently 
certified empirically significant, contain only theoretical terms. There is no such 
requirement in Schurz’s criterion. 
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Schurz (1991, 425) proposes the significance criterion I have ascribed to him as 
necessary and sufficient. But in his (2014b, 312), he treats it as one of two independent, 
merely necessary conditions, the second condition being: 
“[a] theoretical concept τ… is empirically significant in [theory] T only if T 
entails a law of correspondence for τ” (2014b, 312), 
where a law of correspondence for a term τ is “a lawlike (synthetic) sentence of the form 
∀x∀t(Aixt→(τ(x)↔Rixt)), and where Aixt and Rixt are [observational] or pre-
theoretical expressions of T in [theory net] N” (2014b, 307), are descriptive and distinct 
from τ, and where i = (i,…, n) for some whole number n. A descriptive term τ is pre-T-
theoretical just in case there is a theory T* that entails a law of correspondence for τ and 
whose observational vocabulary is a subset of T’s. A theory T’s net is an intricate set- 
and model-theoretic object—its make-up need not concern us—that represents different 
ways of specifying T’s “intended applications” and restricting T’s posits (Schurz 2014a, 
1534). Note that this notion of a law of correspondence is more restrictive that Carnap’s 
notion of a correspondence rule. 
I have overlooked Schurz’s correspondence law condition up until now because it 
is not among the targets of my objection. However, its eligibility to be combined with the 
other conditions further increases the range of options for the proponent of significance 
criteria. In particular, those who do not share Kaplan’s intuition that deoccamizations of 
significant terms are themselves significant could include Schurz’s correspondence law 
condition to rule out deoccamized terms (Schurz 2014b, 312-313). Also, my account of 
shortcut terms, below, will make use of the second of Schurz’s conditions. 
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Schurz’s first, minimal empirical equivalence criterion, as well as Creath’s 
criterion and D1′′, adhere to what I call the predictive power conception of empirical 
significance: all of these criteria certify as empirically significant only terms that allow us 
to augment our total theory’s observational consequence class (where the “total theory” 
includes general theoretical postulates, auxiliary hypotheses about the experimental 
setting, etc.). They are not the only criteria to do so—their predecessors, Carnap (1936-7) 
and Ayer (1946), also adhere to this conception.7 But as I argue in the following section, 
this conception does not do justice to the diversity of contributions to scientific inquiry 
that language can make. 
 
4. The Problem of Shortcut Terms 
A problem with Creath’s and Schurz’s criteria, and with the predictive power conception 
more generally, is that they give negative verdicts on terms that, though they do not 
augment the theory’s predictive power, make it easier to determine which predictions are 
already implicit in a body of knowledge. I call such terms shortcut terms, as they allow us 
to chart a “shortcut” from theory to prediction. The informal gloss just stated suggests 
three conditions as collectively sufficient for a term’s being of this kind: 
[SC] M is a shortcut term with respect to language L, theory T, and 
correspondence rules C containing M if 
(a) Any observation sentence implied by T&C in L is implied by T in L,  
(b) It is easier, given certain possible states of knowledge, to derive some 
observational prediction from T&C in L than from T in L, and 
                                                
7 As does Wright’s (1986) criterion. I pass over this criterion because, unlike those of 
Creath and Schurz, it currently suffers from unpatched punctures (Yi 2001). 
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(c) C indicates how to observationally detect the presence or magnitude of 
M in certain contexts. 
 Condition SC(a) will select terms that predictive power conceptions reckon non-
significant. However, terms that meet the other two conditions will have a strong claim to 
scientific legitimacy. 
 By a derivation’s being easier for a given agent than another I mean, roughly, that 
fewer inferences or less searching (for, e.g., the solution to an equation) would be, in all 
likelihood, required for the agent to know the premises or prove the conclusion of the 
derivation. For present purposes, knowing a proposition may be understood to be a matter 
of having derived it from the postulates of one’s language or achieved a sufficiently high 
credence in it by means of empirical evidence. Computational complexity theory’s 
notions of computational time and space may be taken as precisifications of the notion of 
ease of derivation, so my objection will not hinge on a derivation’s being easier for some 
particular agent who idiosyncratically works better with one set of postulates than 
another.8 
 Condition SC(c) ensures that scientists’ applications of shortcut terms will be 
empirically constrained. It should thereby forestall the objection to a previous definition 
that lacked this condition, which was put to me by Gerhard Schurz: ‘God’ might be a 
shortcut term given the “theory” ‘everything obeys God’s will and if Newtonian 
mechanics is true, then God wills that the planets orbit the sun elliptically’. This “theory” 
would simplify the task of deriving the ellipticality of the planets’ orbits from Newtonian 
mechanics, as the derivation would require no mathematical calculation. But clearly this 
                                                
8 Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla expressed to me the worry that, without a condition like 
this, something could count as a shortcut term on the basis of such an idiosyncracy. 
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does not make ‘God’s will’ a legitimate scientific term. To derive the predictions in this 
way would be, to borrow Russell’s famous wording, to steal the results that Newtonian 
astronomers earned through honest toil. The requirement that God’s will be 
observationally accessible would pre-empt such useless postulation. 
 We might interpret condition SC(c) in a variety of ways. For the sake of 
concreteness I interpret it as the requirement that the theory entail a law of 
correspondence, in terms of Schurz’s (2014a; 2014b) sense, for the term. 
 The notion of a shortcut term is not a purely formal or semantic one; its reference 
in SC(b) to the agent’s states of knowledge makes it partially pragmatic. This sets it apart 
from the concepts figuring in previous objections to significance criteria. But on 
reflection, it should come as no surprise that significance criteria should have to contend 
with the pragmatic aspect of language: significance criteria are supposed to capture a 
dimension of scientific legitimacy, and some of the theoretical virtues guiding science are 
pragmatic. 
 
5. The Problem Applied to Creath’s and Schurz’s Criteria  
I will now introduce the predicate Q1 as shortcut term that Creath’s criterion would 
eliminate from its containing language L1. L1’s primitive vocabulary includes 
• theoretical predicates Q1 and R, each of which applies to object-number pairs, 
where each object has at most one such Q1-magnitude and at most one R-
magnitude;9 
• the terms of basic arithmetic; 
                                                
9 Q1(x,y) and R(x,y) might each be defined as the functions q1(x)=y and r(x)=y, 
respectively. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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• observation predicates O1 and O2, which, like Q1 and R, apply to object-
number pairs; 
• an infinite set of individual constants a, b, c, d, e,…; 
• the classical truth-functional connectives; and 
• first-order quantifiers and variables w, x, y, and z. 
L1 also contains the defined predicates E (even), P (prime), and < (strictly less than). Its 
theoretical postulates and laws of correspondence (in Schurz’s (2014a) sense) are 
[T] (w)(x)[((R(x,w)&Ew&3<w)&∃y∃z(Py&Pz&w=y+z))↔O1(x,w)] 
[CR]  (x)(y)[O1x→(R(x,y)↔O2(x,y))] 
[CQ]  (x)(z)(w)[R(x,w)→((Q1(x,y)&Py&Ew&3<w)↔O1(x,w))] 
 L1’s axioms also include Peano arithmetic and its inference rules the standard 
introduction and elimination rules for the classical truth-functional connectives, first-
order quantifiers, and identity. 
 Q1 meets clause SC(a) with respect to L1, which is to say that it is reckoned non-
significant by Creath’s criterion, as it yields no additional observational predictions. T, 
which does not feature Q1, states that if something’s R-magnitude (the number to which it 
stands in the R-relation) satisfies Goldbach’s conjecture,10 then it also stands in the O1 
relation to this magnitude. So if Goldbach’s conjecture is true, as it seems to be, then T 
entails that anything whose R-magnitude is an even integer x greater than three has O1-
magnitude x. CQ, which does feature Q1, says that if something’s R-magnitude is an even 
integer greater than three, and if its Q1-magnitude is prime, then it is O1-related to its R-
                                                
10 Goldbach’s conjecture says that every even integer greater than three is the sum of two 
primes.  
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magnitude. And these are all the observational consequences of the two postulates. 
Therefore, for any x, y, and z, if O is an observational consequence in L1 of 
CQ&Q1(x,z)&R(x,y) then it is also a consequence of T&R(x,y); but the converse does 
not hold. This lack of predictive power is responsible for Q1’s failure to meet D1′(e). 
 That Q1 satisfies SC(b) can be illustratedby an agent who 
[A1] Does not justifiably believe Goldbach’s conjecture, and 
[A2] Justifiably believes that the set of observation statements entailed by CQ, 
together with the relevant beliefs about Q1 and R, is a subset of the set of 
observation statements entailed by T and these same beliefs about R. 
While belief states satisfying A1 and A2 may be unlikely, they are perfectly coherent. 
Such a state could arise through the agent’s 
[A3] Having checked T and CQ for enough of the same values for A2 to be the 
case, but 
[A4] Not having checked T for enough values to justifiably believe Goldbach’s 
conjecture. 
Such an agent knows that Goldbach’s conjecture holds for even integers greater than 
three that are something’s R-magnitude and that, when added to a prime number, yield 
this same thing’s Q1-magnitude; but she does not know that it holds for all integers. She 
justifiably believes that what she has found to hold of even integers greater than three that 
stand in the right Q1- and R-relations to things cannot be assumed to hold of all even 
integers greater than three. If the coherence of this last stipulation should require further 
argument, we can assume also that the R-magnitudes which she has found to satisfy 
Goldbach’s conjecture all have some conspicuous number-theoretic property—e.g., being 
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the sum of a prime and a semiprime (i.e., the product of two primes). 
 Now suppose that this same agent knows that R(a,c) and that Q1(a,b)&R(a,c), 
where b is prime and c is a very large even number greater than three. She suspects that 
O1(a,c) might be an observational consequence of her theoretical postulates and 
knowledge, but has not rigorously derived it. She can see that it will be easier to do so if 
she relies on Q1(a,b)&R(a,c)&CQ rather than R(a,c)&T. On the latter approach, she 
would have to rely on T. Given that, by hypothesis, she cannot get the antecedent of the 
appropriate instantiation of T through a direct appeal to Goldbach’s conjecture, in order 
to become entitled to use it as a premise, she would need to find a pair of primes that add 
up to c (a Goldbach partition of c) or, in the case of the agent discussed above, a prime 
and a semiprime that add up to c (a Goldbach semi-partition of c). But Goldbach (semi-
)partitions can be difficult to find and verify for large values. By contrast, if she tries to 
derive O1(a,c) from Q1(a,b)&R(a,c)&T&CQ, then she could rely on CQ instead of T, and 
would only need to show that the b is prime. And primeness is generally easier—less 
computationally complex—to establish than possession of a Goldbach (semi-)partition: to 
find a Goldbach partition of x, one must verify that two numbers are each prime and add 
up to x.11 
 Finally, CQ ensures that Q1 satisfies SC(c) with respect to L1 and Creath’s 
criterion. 
                                                
11 To be concrete, we might suppose that the agent uses the algorithm developed by e 
Silva, Herzog, and Pardi (2013), which has computed Goldbach partitions for every even 
number between six and 4×1018 (which entails the validity of the conjecture up to 
8.37×1026). This algorithm contains a sub-algorithm (a sieve of Eratosthenes) that 
generates the prime numbers. And such a sub-algorithm is of course less complex, in 
regards to computational time or space, than its containing super-algorithm. So since 
using Q1 would require a sub-algorithm and eschewing it the super-algorithm, using Q1 
eases the computational burden of deriving the prediction in question. 
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 Schurz’s criterion also deems Q1 non-significant, but in part by design: T’s 
observational consequences are too few to bring the predicate up to the criterion’s 
standards. From Schurz’s perspective, to include in the language a purely computational 
aid to R would be to compound needless complications, as R itself unifies too little 
observational knowledge to earn its keep. So Q1 does not ground an objection to Schurz’s 
criterion or to D1′′. 
 But Q2 of L2 and theory T stands in an analogous relationship to Schurz’s criterion 
and D1′′. L2 is the same as L1 except that it replaces Q1 with Q2, and contains the 
additional observation predicates O3, O4, O5, O6, O1′, and O2′ and theoretical predicate S. 
T is composed of the following postulates and laws of correspondence: 
[T1-6] (x)(y)(S(x,y)↔Oi(x,y)), i = (1,…, 6) 
[T7] (w)(x)[((R(x,w)&Ew&3<w)&∃y∃z(Py&Pz&w=y+z))→S(x,w)] 
[T8] (x)(y)(O1′(x,y)→R(x,y)) 
[T9] O1′(a,b)&Eb&3<b 
[T10] (x)(y)(O2′(x,y)→R(x,y)) 
[T11] O2′(c,d)&Ed&3<d 
[T12] O2′(a,e)&Pe 
[T13] (x)(y)(O2′(x,y)→Q2(x,y)) 
[T14] (w)(x)(z)[((R(x,w)&Ew&3<w)&(Q2(x,z)&Pz))→O1(x,y)] 
T1&…&T12 does not contain Q2 and is a minimal empirically equivalent axiomatization 
of the set of relevant consequence elements of T. So Q2 meets SC(a) and by Schurz’s 
criterion is non-significant relative to T. 
 Q2 also meets SC(b) with respect to this criterion and language; the reasons why 
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are analogous to the reasons, given above, for Q1’s satisfying these conditions with 
respect to Creath’s criterion. Consider an agent who 
[A5] Does not justifiably believe Goldbach’s conjecture, and 
[A6] Justifiably believes that the set of observation statements entailed by 
T9&…&T14 is a subset of the set of observation statements entailed by 
T1&…&T12. 
For this agent, it will be easier to predict O1(a,b) by deriving it from the Q2-containing 
T9&…&T14 than from the Q2-deficient T1&…&T9; the latter but not the former 
derivation would require a difficult to find Goldbach partition. 
 Finally, T13 satisfies SC(c) for Q2 in T with respect to Schurz’s criterion. 
 Creath’s criterion instructs us to remove Q1 from L1 and Schurz’s criterion and 
D1′′ to remove Q2 and from L2 and T, respectively. However, Q1 and Q2’s satisfaction of 
SC(b) and SC(c) with respect to the relevant criteria, languages, and theories calls both 
criteria’s verdicts into question. The agents discussed above—the ones that meet 
conditions A1 and A2, and A5 and A6 respectively—could determine their postulates’ 
observational consequences by means of the postulates containing the shortcut terms and 
thereby spare themselves the trouble of finding Goldbach partitions. This is a good reason 
for these agents to keep the shortcut terms in their languages or theories. It is widely 
recognized by philosophers of science that this kind of ease of derivation is a theoretical 
virtue. Some consider it to be a kind of simplicity (Baker 2013; Barrios 2015), while 
others take simplicity to consist in nothing more than it (Peirce 1935; Lindsay 1937; 
Ludlow 2011). Furthermore, shortcut terms are scientifically useful from the standpoint 
of what I will call ‘Carnap’s pragmatism’, which is an important rationale for the 
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significance project, and which I discuss in section 7. 
Are there examples of shortcut terms that have contributed to actual scientific 
inquiry? Psillos claims that the concept of asymptotic freedom in quantum 
chromodynamics helps to “establish connections between other theoretical terms” 
without “contributing to the derivation of fresh observational consequences” (Psillos 
2008, 137). While the theoretical role ascribed to asymptotic freedom here is similar to 
that of a shortcut term, there is a difference: shortcut terms not only establish connections 
between theoretical terms, but also facilitate derivations of observational predictions. Of 
course, theoretical connections might have this kind of collateral impact on prediction, 
but to show as much would require further discussion, which I am not in a position to 
give. Asymptotic freedom might be a counter-example to predictive power criteria on the 
basis of its inter-theoretical connections alone, depending on whether and how it makes 
physical theories easier to work with. 
 An anonymous reviewer suggested a method for constructing shortcut terms by 
means of the concept of gamma rays. Let T1 and T2 be theories and M1 and M2 theoretical 
predicates, such that T1&M1(a) and T2&M2(a) are empirically equivalent, and such that 
empirically establishing M1(a) involves detecting a microparticle, which is relatively 
difficult to do, whereas empirically establishing M2(a) involves detecting a gamma ray, 
which is relatively easy to do. M2 is therefore a shortcut term. 
 The reviewer also pointed out that this example is highly general, in that it puts 
few restrictions on the theories or predicates involved, requiring only on the inclusion of 
basic particle and wave physics. 
 I conjecture—though I will not argue—that the shortcut term objection to 
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predictive power conceptions can be generalized in another way: for any reasonable 
explicatum E of the notion of essential contribution to an observational prediction, there 
will be some possible shortcut term that does not satisfy E but that would allow its users 
to circumvent searches for Goldbach partitions in their derivations of their theories’ 
observable consequences. 
 
6. Responses and Counter-Responses 
One might respond on behalf of the predictive power conception that the advantages of 
including Q1 and Q2 in their respective languages are relatively minor and are outweighed 
by the increased syntactic complexity that the terms and their associated correspondence 
rules would engender. The premise of this response may be true, but the conclusion does 
not help the predictive power conception. The objection points out that charting a 
shortcut to an observation statement is not sufficient for admissibility into the theoretical 
language. But shortcut terms will pose a problem for the predictive power conception so 
long as there is pro tanto reason to admit them. Significance criteria are supposed to state 
standards for what counts as a scientific theory; they should not provide any guidance 
beyond this concerning whether to use a minimally acceptable term. And if there can be a 
pro tanto reason to admit a term, then the term satisfies the minimal standards that 
significance criteria aim to capture. 
 Justus (2014) contrasts Church’s objection to Ayer’s criterion with Kaplan’s 
(1975) objection to Carnap’s criterion: whereas the former objection identifies a decisive 
technical flaw, the latter relies on the controversial philosophical intuition that 
deoccamization preserves significance. Justus then contends that there is no “plausible 
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basis for claiming deoccamization should preserve empirical significance” (Justus 2014, 
426). He cites Glymour’s contention that deoccamized theories are 
just the sort of theories that theorists abjure; physicists say they have ‘redundant 
quantities’ or ‘unobservable quantities’ and regard them with suspicion and 
worse… without appropriate restrictions, the hypothetico-deductive view [which 
is reflected in Carnap’s informal characterization of empirical significance] is 
committed to the legitimacy of deoccamized theories, and that commitment may 
not accord with either intuitive judgment or scientific practice. (Glymour 1980, 
32; quoted in Justus 2014, 426)  
 It is true that the problem of shortcut terms, like Kaplan’s and Achinstein’s and 
unlike Church’s counter-examples, does not expose a decisive formal flaw in the target 
significance criteria. However, unlike Kaplan’s objection, it does not rely on a 
philosophical intuition that the proponent of significance criteria can easily abandon. As 
noted above, the legitimacy of shortcut terms follows from the fact that ease of use is a 
theoretical virtue. I as I discuss next, it also follows from a leading rationale for 
significance criteria, viz. Carnap’s. 
 
7. Carnap’s Pragmatic Rationale for Significance Criteria 
I want to now consider the reasons for seeking a significance criterion in the first place. I 
focus on the reasons given by Carnap, which have been highly influential. As I will show, 
Carnap’s conception of the significance project entails the admissibility of shortcut terms. 
And it is also conducive to the proposal, which I make in the next section, to give various 
“special” explications empirical of significance, for various languages and theories. 
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 I will being relying on an interpretation I have developed at greater length 
elsewhere (Surovell 2017), according to which Carnap’s conception of language, which 
encompasses his empiricism, derives from his pragmatism. The latter involves two 
stances. The first treats language as a tool that can be used for a chosen purpose: 
the choice of a certain language structure... is a practical decision like the 
choice of an instrument; it depends chiefly upon the purposes for which the 
instrument—here the language—is intended to be used and upon the 
properties of the instrument. (1956b, 43) 
The proposal to use a particular language is thus practically justified to the extent that it 
achieves this purpose efficiently: “[a]s a hammer helps a man do better and more 
efficiently what he did before with his unaided hand, so a logical tool helps a man do 
better and more efficiently what he did before with his unaided brain” (Carnap 1943, 
viii). 
 On this view, we are practically justified in using a significance criterion in so far 
as it helps us select the vocabulary that would be minimally acceptable for achieving the 
purpose that we have chosen for language; it should admit all and only the terms that 
advance our purpose in some way. 
 The second component of Carnap’s pragmatism specifies which linguistic aim is 
most amenable to the scientific enterprise; it says that the language of science is an 
instrument to help with inferences to and from observation reports. In his (1953a), 
Carnap conceives of the “formal” sciences—i.e. logic and mathematics—as auxiliaries to 
the “factual”—i.e. theoretical or empirical—sciences; “[f]ormal science has no 
independent significance, but is an auxiliary component introduced for technical reasons 
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in order to facilitate linguistic transformations in the factual sciences” (1953a, 127). He 
expresses this view again in his (1939, 2). Logic and mathematics thus serve an auxiliary, 
purely inferential function on behalf of the empirical part of the language for science, 
according to Carnap. 
 As we have seen, Carnap further sub-divides empirical science into theoretical and 
observational sub-languages. And he conceives of the postulates of the theoretical 
language as instruments for inferring observational predictions: 
[f]or an observer X to “accept” the postulates of T means here not simply to take T 
as an uninterpreted calculus, but to use T together with specified rules of 
correspondence C for guiding his expectations by deriving predictions about future 
observable events from observed events with the help of T and C. (1956a, 45) 
In short, Carnap’s pragmatism says that languages for science are “prediction machines” 
whose practical purpose is to facilitate inferences to and from observational predictions 
and reports.  
 I claimed that Carnap’s pragmatism provides his rationale for a criterion of 
empirical significance. Here’s how. As I discussed above, significance criteria are 
explicata for the informal notion of a term’s making a “difference for the prediction of an 
observable event” (Carnap 1956a, 49). But from the point of view of Carnap’s 
pragmatism, all terms that make such a difference make some contribution to a 
language’s fulfillment of its inferential function in science. And only such terms make 
such a contribution; terms that make no difference for prediction would increase the 
language’s complexity without any compensating pragmatic advantage. So we should not 
admit these terms into our language, and we should remove any that we might have 
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already admitted. Significance criteria expedite the Carnapian pragmatist’s choice of a 
language for science by screening out terms that are useless given her aims. 
 In section 6, I considered the argument that shortcut terms’ veneer of scientific 
legitimacy, like that of Kaplan’s deoccamized predicates, is a mere philosophical 
intuition. We can now see how Carnap’s pragmatism entails the scientific legitimacy of 
shortcut terms: the Carnapian pragmatist’s purpose in using scientific language is to more 
efficiently perform inferences to and from observation sentences; but this is exactly what 
shortcut terms do. 
 
8. Special Explication as an Alternative 
Perhaps the hole that shortcut terms puncture in recent criteria can be patched. Still, given 
the persistence of the cycle of punctures and patches, it would be prudent for the advocate 
of significance criteria to consider alternatives to the assumptions that have so far guided 
her project. Specifically, I want to suggest, the significance project should not limit itself 
to the predictive power conception or to the kinds of highly general criteria that have so 
far been the norm. In this section, I will sketch an alternative to these prevailing 
assumptions. 
 My proposal is inspired by the following remarks by Goldfarb and Ricketts: 
[t]he lack of such a general criterion [of empirical significance] is not as 
damaging to Carnap’s program as is commonly thought. Carnap can still criticize 
what he calls metaphysics by first demanding that the linguistic framework in 
which the metaphysical claims are made be laid out clearly; and then invoking 
pragmatic criticisms, of the form that in the given framework most interesting-
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sounding claims turn out to be analytic, or that certain vocabulary doesn’t add to 
explanatory scope, or whatnot. The point is that the criticisms can be made case-
by-case, without general criteria. (1992, 74-75) 
I will recast the approach described in this passage as a method of explicating the 
informal concept of empirical significance. This recasting may help to clarify the 
proposal and highlight its advantages. 
 As I discussed above, the various criteria of empirical significance are attempts to 
explicate the informal explicandum of an expression’s making a difference for 
observational prediction. And they are attempts to do so in a highly general way; extant 
significance criteria are supposed to apply to any language or theory whatsoever. I want 
to consider this aspect of significance criteria through the lens of Carnap’s notion of call 
general and special concepts. A general concept is defined so as to be “applicable to any 
language whatsoever” (Carnap 1937, 167), or to “all languages of a certain kind” (Carnap 
1937, 153), e.g., first-order languages, languages with classical connectives, etc. Though 
Carnap does not explicitly elucidate the notion of application in play here, he clearly 
intends a concept C-in-L to “apply” to a language L* only if L ranges over a class of 
languages to which L* belongs. When I say that a sentence is logically true-in-L, in the 
sense of being true-in-L on all re-interpretations of L’s descriptive vocabulary, I mean for 
L to range over all languages. By contrast, the ‘English’ in the concept of truth-in-English 
ranges only over the various dialects of English. 
 In place of Carnap’s sharp distinction between general and special, I will use 
comparative relations of more or less general and more or less special than; thus the 
concept of logical truth-in-L is more general and less special than the concept of truth-in-
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English.12 For present purposes, these comparative concepts may be loosely understood. 
 In his discussions of general vs. special concepts, Carnap focuses on restrictions 
on the scope of applicability having to do with languages’ logical notions e.g., restrictions 
to intuitionistic or classical languages. But given that a language for science, in his sense, 
is also partially constituted by its theoretical and observational postulates, we can also 
restrict concepts to languages with or without certain such postulates. The relatively 
special explicata that I will propose for empirical significance will involve restrictions of 
this kind. 
 So far, all attempts to explicate empirical significance have been highly general: 
they are supposed to apply to any axiomatization of any body of scientific theory 
whatsoever. I believe that Goldfarb and Ricketts’s proposal of “case-by-case”, pragmatic 
selection of the scientifically admissible languages is best understood as the proposal to 
give relatively special explications of the informal notion of empirical significance. 
 What would a relatively special explication of empirical significance look like? 
There are various possibilities. For certain languages one of the extant significance 
criteria might work. For example, Creath’s or Schurz’s criteria could work specifically 
for many languages that have no shortcut terms. For others, such as L1, discussed above, 
we could resort to enumeration: we could ask for each candidate set of descriptive terms 
of L1 whether it accords with the informal notion of making a difference for the 
prediction of an observable event and certify its members empirically significant if and 
only if it does so. 
                                                
12 I do so to address an argument, put to me by an anonymous reviewer, that contends that 
there are no meta-linguistic concepts that apply to all languages; rather, such concepts 
must be relativized to a logical type.  
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 The obvious advantage of this case-by-case approach is that relatively special 
explicata will be less susceptible than general explicata to counter-example. Since we can 
see, through consideration of the informal concept of that which makes a difference for 
the prediction of an observable event, that Q1 falls under the concept, we include it in L1’s 
theoretical vocabulary. Moreover, if we overlook a deserving term or mistakenly include 
an undeserving one in our enumeration, adding or removing it will not be an “unintuitive 
and ineffective [patch]” (1988, 4). There is nothing untoward about improving on a 
definition by enumeration by adding to or removing from the list. 
 Is the case-by-case approach to explication, so understood, methodologically 
sound? The desiderata governing explication do not rule it out. Explication is, 
fundamentally, an attempt to state a precise definition for, and thereby improve upon, an 
informal notion. Thus, one desideratum of explication is exactness of the precisely 
defined explicatum. A second is similarity of the explicatum to the explicandum. But 
unlike, say, dictionary definition, explication does not require complete or even 
significant similarity to the explicandum; large deviations are permitted. But such 
deviations should improve upon the concept by making it more fruitful or simpler, which 
are the third and fourth desiderata for explication (Carnap 1953b, section 3). Relatively 
special explications can do well according to all four desiderata. 
 Carnap explicitly argues that one may legitimately give special explications of a 
notion without giving it a fully general explication. In response to Quine’s objection that 
‘analytic’ has not been defined for an arbitrary language, Carnap writes: 
[i]n case Quine’s remarks are meant as a demand to be given one definition 
applicable to all systems [i.e. languages], then such a demand is manifestly 
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unreasonable; it is certainly neither fulfilled nor fulfillable for semantic or 
syntactic concepts, as Quine knows. (Carnap 1991, 430) 
Carnap goes on to state that it is therefore unlikely that Quine meant to make such a 
demand of explications of the informal notion of analyticity. And Carnap is right that 
Quine did not, in general, require that concepts possess fully general characterizations; 
Quine argues that various concepts that are indispensible to linguistics and logic—those 
of grammatical category, construction, and morpheme—resist fully general definitions, 
but that “anyway there is no need to force transcendence” (Quine 1986, 20) 
(transcendence being Quine’s analogue for generality), as the relatively special 
definitions of the notions in question suffice for the relevant research programs. 
 Why, then, have the proponents of significance criteria devoted so much effort to 
constructing fully general criteria? Generality does seem prima facie desirable. A more 
general explication can provide a more complete or more exact understanding: with its 
help, one can avoid relying on the inexact explicandum to determine whether a given 
special explicatum is adequate. This might be reason enough to continue to pursue the 
project of explicating generally empirical significance. But it is no reason to think that it 
is full generality or bust for empirical significance. 
 Relatively special explications of empirical significance would serve the same 
purpose as more general ones. As the passage quoted earlier from Goldfarb and Ricketts 
indicates, it would ground the same criticisms of metaphysics and pseudo-science. The 
criticisms made on a case-by-case basis 
have no different status from those that would be generated by a general criterion 
of testability; for even a general criterion could have only pragmatic sanction. 
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That is, a general criterion would simply be a proposal for rating linguistic 
frameworks, whose merits could be urged only on pragmatic grounds. It would 
avoid the drudgery of case-by-case criticism, but would not escape its 
noncognitive nature. (Goldfarb and Ricketts 1992, 75) 
 In section 7, I explained how Carnap’s pragmatism motivates the use of 
significance criteria. We can make the same point in Goldfarb and Ricketts’s terms: 
Carnap’s pragmatism provides one interpretation of the “pragmatic grounds” of either a 
“general criterion” or the “case-by-case” criticism mentioned in the passage above. 
Ricketts might disagree with this proposal qua Carnap interpretation. Elsewhere, he 
maintains that any systematic statement of the standards for scientific explication (or in 
Ricketts’s terminology, “clarification”) would amount to the kind of philosophy that 
Carnap “eschews in [The Logical Syntax of Language]” (Ricketts 1994, 196-197). 
Against this interpretation, I would offer the textual evidence presented in section 7. But 
in any case, my present concern is not exegetical. My point is that what I have called 
‘Carnap’s pragmatism’ provides a serviceable basis for the pragmatic case-by-case 
criticism of candidate languages for science. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Optimists about a precise demarcation, at the level of individual sentences, between the 
empirically meaningful and the empirically meaningless, have so far assumed that the 
defining characteristic of the empirical is some kind of predictive power, and that this 
concept of predictive power must be explicated through a highly general definition. I 
have argued against both of these assumptions. Against the predictive power conception, 
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and in particular, Creath’s (1976) and Schurz’s (1991; 2014b) significance criteria, I 
raised the problem of shortcut terms, i.e., terms that add no new observational predictions 
but that make it easier to determine latent predictions. Against the assumption that the 
demarcation between the empirical and non-empirical needs to be general, I argued that 
Goldfarb and Ricketts’s (1992) case-by-case procedure for identifying the scientifically 
admissible terms may be understood as a series of relatively special explications, without 
any fully general explication, of the informal notion of empirical significance. I claimed 
that there is nothing methodologically unsound in such a procedure. Furthermore, from a 
Carnapian perspective at least, a demarcation arrived at through this case-by-case process 
would have the same force as one that relies on a fully general significance criterion; both 
are ultimately motivated by the same pragmatic considerations. 
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